Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model by Futagami, Koichi et al.
 
 
 
Discussion Papers In Economics 
And Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN
 
Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model 
 
 
Koichi Futagami, Tatsuro Iwaisako, and Makoto Okamura 
 
 
Discussion Paper 11-20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graduate School of Economics and 
Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) 
Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560-0043, JAPAN 
 
Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General 
Equilibrium Model 
 
 
Koichi Futagami, Tatsuro Iwaisako, and Makoto Okamura 
 
 
Discussion Paper 11-20 
Welfare Analysis of Free Entry in a Dynamic General
Equilibrium Model¤
Koichi Futagamiy, Tatsuro Iwaisakozx, and Makoto Okamura{
May 25, 2011
Abstract
This paper presents a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium in dynamic general
equilibrium environments with oligopolistic competition. First, we show that a marginal
decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium improves social welfare. Sec-
ond, we show that if a government can control the number of entrants intertemporally so
as to maximize the level of social welfare, the number of entrants under free entry may be
less than the second-best number of entrants. Capital accumulation plays an important role
in determining whether excess entry occurs.
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1 Introduction
One purpose of deregulation policies is to promote the entry of firms into industries that have
been protected either by government policies or the entry barriers of incumbents. Governments
of many developed countries often implement deregulation policies. Typical examples are as
follows: the Government of the United States deregulated the airline industry with the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978. In 1986 the Government of the United Kingdom undertook the
deregulation of the securities market, the so called ‘Big Bang’. Such deregulation policies are
regarded as increasing the economic performance of countries.
Deregulation policies that intend to increase the number of firms have significant impacts
on the economy. First, if the production of goods is undertaken under increasing returns to
scale due to the existence of fixed costs, this increases the number of firms and promotes com-
petition, decreases the output level of each entrant, and leads to a rise in average costs. This
has a negative effect on the level of welfare. Second, an increase in the number of firms raises
the intensity of competition and thus reduces price–cost markups . This increases the factor
demand, especially the demand for capital. Consequently the rental of capital rises and capital
accumulation is promoted. Because an acceleration of capital accumulation causes an increase
in output, an increase in the number of firms can improve welfare. In order to examine whether
the deregulation policies improve social welfare, we examine which effect overcomes the other
in a dynamic general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition.
In the present paper, we examine the above welfare effects of deregulation, that is, increasing
the number of entrants in a dynamic general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition.
First, we investigate how a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium
affects social welfare. The government decreases the number of entrants by collecting a tax or
a franchise fee from firms. A marginal decrease in the number of firms temporarily raises the
consumption volume of households, thus increasing the level of welfare. However, reduction
of capital thereafter reduces the welfare level. We can show that the former positive effect
overcomes the latter negative effects and thus a marginal decrease in the number of firms can
improve social welfare. Second, we show that the number of entrants under free entry may be
less than the second-best number of entrants if a government can control the number of entrants
so as to maximize the level of social welfare . That is, an insufficient entry occurs at the free
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entry equilibrium.
As for the first effect described above, Perry (1984), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and
Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) show the excess entry theorem. The excess entry theorem states
that a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free entry equilibrium improves welfare
if firms produce goods of strategic substitutes and compete in the Cournot fashion and if there
exist fixed set-up costs. This theorem provides a counter example to the common ideas of the
traditional theory of industrial organization.1
However, the above research was restricted to partial equilibrium analyses and there has
been no research that examines the excess entry theorem by taking into account capital accu-
mulation over time.2 Because the theorem places attention on the long-run equilibrium, the
disregard of capital accumulation by the theorem seems surprising. If the promotion of entry
reduces an incentive for capital accumulation, such a promotion might decrease social welfare.
In fact, as this paper’s analyses show, capital accumulation plays an important role and can
overturn the result of the excess entry theorem.
There are some studies of macroeconomic dynamics that incorporate oligopolistic compe-
tition with free entry. Gali and Zilibotti (1995) and Kuhry (2001) and Dos Santos Ferreira and
Lloyd-Braga (2005) investigated the dynamic characteristics of the free entry equilibrium in
dynamic general equilibrium models with Cournot oligopoly.3 However, these researches did
not examine welfare aspects of the free entry equilibrium. Therefore, the present analysis is the
first one to explore the welfare properties of the free entry equilibrium in the dynamic general
equilibrium framework with Cournot competition. 4
1Thereafter, Besley and Suzumura (1992) and Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993) extended the analysis
based on the excess entry theorem to a dynamic game setting, that is, a two-stage game setting. In the game,
firms undertake cost-reducing investment in the first stage of the game and compete in a Cournot fashion in the
second stage of the game. They derive the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game. These papers
examined the roles of the commitment of firms in the first stage.
2Konishi et al. (1990), examine the excess entry theorem in a general equilibrium model, however, their model
is a static model.
3Some studies investigated the dynamic properties of equilibrium paths in dynamic models with monopolistic
competition. See Benhabib and Gali (1995) and Gali (1994, 1995, 1996).
4Wu and Zhang (2000) examined the welfare effects of income taxation in a dynamic general equilibrium model
under imperfect competition. However, this research did not examine welfare aspects of the free entry equilibrium.
In addition, their model incorporated not oligopoly but monopolistic competition.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we set up the dynamic general equilib-
rium model. In section 3, we derive the steady state equilibrium with free entry. In section 4, we
examine whether or not a marginal decrease in the number of entrants at free entry equilibrium
improves social welfare. We employ Judd’s (1982) method to evaluate the welfare effect by a
marginal change of the number of entrants. In section 5, we construct a government’s optimal
entry regulation problem and derive the steady state equilibrium under the second-best policy.5
Section 6 provides an analytical comparison of the steady state equilibrium under free entry
with the steady state equilibrium under the second-best policy. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a basic representative agent model, that is, the closed economy consists of a contin-
uum of consumers populating L, who live infinitely. Each consumer supplies one unit of labor
inelastically at each point of time. In order to analyze the entry of firms, the present model has
some important features in the production structure as follows. There are one kind of final good,
which can be devoted to both consumption good production and investment good production.
The final good is produced using intermediate goods. In each intermediate goods sector, the
firms behave as Cournot-Nash competitors and the number of entrants is determined by the free
entry condition. In order to analyze the welfare effects of regulation and deregulation of entry,
we assume that a government impose a tax or a franchise fee on entry firms and it can regulate
the number of entrants indirectly by changing this tax or franchise fee.
2.1 Firms
The final goods sector is produced by the use of intermediate goods. In a similar way as in
Ethier (1982), production technology of the final goods sector is specified as a CES production
function:
Y =
µZ 1
0
X
¾¡1
¾
i di
¶ ¾
¾¡1
; ¾ ¸ 0; (1)
5Devereux and Lee (2001) examine the gains from trade under imperfect competition in a similar dynamic
general equilibrium model. They compare the free entry equilibrium with the social planning outcome, that is, the
first-best outcome. In particular, excess entry occurs in a natural setting of parameters in their model. However,
their focus is on the effects on countries opening up to international trade.
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where Y denotes an amount of final goods, Xi denotes the quantity of the intermediate input
i 2 [0; 1], and ¾ represents the elasticity of substitution among the intermediate inputs.
We assume that perfect competition prevails in the final goods market and let the final goods
be the numeraire. The first-order conditions for the profit maximization of the final goods sector
are given by the following:
Y
1
¾X
¡ 1
¾
i = Pi; i 2 [0; 1]; (2)
where Pi denotes the price of intermediate goods i.
Each intermediate good is produced by using capital and labor. Firms face the technology
given by
xij = k
®
ij`
1¡®
ij ¡ Á; (3)
where xij , kij , `ij , and Á denote an amount of output, capital and labor inputs, and the fixed cost
to firms j in the intermediate goods sector i, respectively. We assume that in each intermediate
goods sector Cournot competition and free entry prevail. We can split the firms’ profit maxi-
mization problem into two steps. In the first step, solving the firms’ cost minimization, we can
get the labor and capital demands and the cost function as follows:
`(w; r;xij) =
µ
1¡ ®
®
¶® ³w
r
´¡®
(xij + Á); (4)
k(w; r;xij) =
µ
®
1¡ ®
¶1¡® ³w
r
´1¡®
(xij + Á); (5)
­(xij;w; r) = ®
¡® (1¡ ®)¡(1¡®) r®w1¡®(xij + Á) ´ q(w; r)(xij + Á); (6)
where q(w; r) denotes the unit cost function, and r and w denote the rental rate of capital and
the wage rate respectively. In the second step, using this unit cost function, we can write the
profit of firm j in the intermediate goods sector i as follows:
¼ij(xij; xi;¡j) = Pi(
X
j
xij)xij ¡ q(w; r)(xij + Á);
where Pi(
P
j xij) denotes the inverse demand function of intermediate good i. Substituting the
demand function of intermediate goods i, (2) into this profit, the profit-maximizing condition of
firm j is given by µ
1¡ xij
¾Xi
¶
Pi(
X
j
xij) = q(w; r):
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Therefore, the amount of the firms’ output in intermediate goods sector i in a symmetric
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, xij = xi satisfies the following condition:
Pi(Nixi) = ¹(Ni)q(w; r); (7)
where Ni denotes the number of firms that enter the market of intermediate goods i and ¹(Ni)
denotes the markup of price over cost given by
¹(Ni) =
1
1¡ 1
¾Ni
; i 2 [0; 1]:
These show that an increase in the number of entrants reduces the markup.
We suppose that a government imposes a tax on each entrant, which is proportional to the
set-up cost, q(w; r)Á. Letting m denote the tax rate on the entry, the government can regulate the
number of entrants by controlling this tax rate. Using (7), the profit of the firm in intermediate
good sector i in symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium is given by
¼i(Ni) = Pi(Nixi)xi ¡ q(w; r)(xi + Á)¡mq(w; r)Á
= f[¹(Ni)¡ 1]xi ¡ (1 +m)Ág q(w; r): (8)
Firms are symmetric in each intermediate good sector and furthermore the intermediate good
sectors are symmetric, we obtain kij = Kt=Nt and lij = L=Nt. Therefore, the amount of
intermediate goods that one firm supplies, xt is given by
xt =
Kt
®L1¡®
Nt
¡ Á: (9)
Because the intermediate goods sectors are symmetrical, Yt = Xt. From this and (2), we get
Pi = 1. Substituting this into (7), we get ¹(N)q(w; r) = 1. Combining this with the cost
minimizing conditions (4) and (5), equilibrium factor prices are given by
rt =
1
¹(Nt)
®Kt
®¡1L1¡®; (10)
wt =
1
¹(Nt)
(1¡ ®)Kt®L¡®: (11)
The number of entrants will adjust until the profit becomes zero, that is, ¼(Nt) = 0. Substituting
(9) into (8), we obtain the zero profit condition as follows:
[¹(Nt)¡ 1]
µ
Kt
®L1¡®
Nt
¡ Á
¶
= (1 +m)Á; (12)
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which determines the number of firms in each intermediate goods sector at time t. Solving this
equation for Nt yields the equilibrium number of firms under the entry tax m, Nt as follows:
N(Kt;m) =
m
2(1 +m)¾
+
(·
m
2(1 +m)¾
¸2
+
Kt
®L1¡®
(1 +m)¾Á
) 1
2
: (13)
Total differentiation of (12) yields
@N(K;m)
@m
= ¡ N(¾N ¡ 1)
1 + (2¾N ¡ 1)(1 +m) < 0; (14)
@N(K;m)
@K
=
N(¾N ¡ 1)
1 + (2¾N ¡ 1)(1 +m) > 0; (15)
Therefore, it is straightforward to show that raising the tax on entries discourages the entry and
thus decreases the number of entrants for any constant value of K. Moreover, (15) shows that
an increase in capital stock allows more firms to enter the market.
2.2 Households
We consider an economy populated with L households, who each supply one unit of labor
inelastically. Each household seeks to maximize the lifetime utility
U =
Z 1
0
e¡½t
ct
1¡µ ¡ 1
1¡ µ dt; (16)
where, ct is consumption per household and ½ is the discount rate. The revenue earned by
tax on entries is distributed equally among consumers through lump-sum transfer. Thus the
household’s intertemporal budget constraint is given by
_at = rtat + wt ¡ ct + Ntmq(wt; rt)Á
L
; (17)
lim
t!1
exp
µ
¡
Z t
0
rsds
¶
at ¸ 0; (18)
where at denotes asset holdings per household. The dynamic optimization of the utility func-
tion, (16), subject to the intertemporal constraint, (17) and (18), yields the Euler equation and
the transversality condition
_ct
ct
=
1
µ
(rt ¡ ½); (19)
lim
t!1
e¡½tct¡µat = 0: (20)
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3 Market equilibrium with free entry
In this section, we derive the steady state under the free entry equilibrium in the long run, that
is, the steady state with no entry tax, m = 0. For simplicity, we assume no depreciation. Then
the equilibrium condition of final goods market is given by Yt = Ct + _Kt + ÁNt. Combining
this, (19), (10), and (13), the dynamics of this economy can be summarized by the following
two differential equations:
_Ct
Ct
=
1
µ
·
1
¹(N(Kt))
®Kt
®¡1L1¡® ¡ ½
¸
; (21)
_Kt = Kt
®L1¡® ¡ ÁN(Kt)¡ Ct; (22)
where
N(Kt) =
µ
Kt
®L1¡®
¾Á
¶ 1
2
: (23)
First, we derive the conditions under which there exist steady states of the free entry equi-
librium. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The free entry equilibrium has steady states, if, and only if the following in-
equality is satisfied:
®2
2¡ ®
(·
2(1¡ ®)
2¡ ®
¸2µ
¾L
Á
¶) 1¡®®
> ½: (24)
Proof. First, we must investigate the character of the interest rate. The interest rate is the
function of K, and is given by
r(K) ´
"
1¡
µ
Á
¾
1
K®L1¡®
¶ 1
2
#
®K®¡1L1¡®: (25)
Differentiating r(K) with K, we obtain
dr(K)
dK
=
"
2¡ ®
2
µ
Á
¾K®L1¡®
¶ 1
2
¡ (1¡ ®)
#
®K®¡2L1¡®: (26)
We let ¹K denote the value of K that satisfies fdr(K)g=(dK) = 0 and from (26), we obtain
¹K =
(·
2¡ ®
2(1¡ ®)
¸2µ
Á
¾L1¡®
¶) 1®
: (27)
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The graph of r(K) has the unique maximum value, r( ¹K) as depicted in Figure 1. Here, the
parameters must satisfy r( ¹K) > ½ for the existence of a steady state. From (25) and (26), there
exist steady states if, and only if the following inequality is satisfied:
®2
2¡ ®
(·
2(1¡ ®)
2¡ ®
¸2µ
¾L
Á
¶) 1¡®®
> ½: (28)
If this inequality does not hold, the steady states of the free entry equilibrium do not exist.
Thus, we assume that (28) holds true in the rest of this paper.
There are two values of K that satisfy r(K) = ½ when (28) holds as depicted in Figure 1.
However, the lower value of K is unstable, and therefore the unique stable steady state of the
free entry equilibrium is the higher value of K that satisfies r(K) = ½.
From (21) and (22), the phase diagram of this dynamic system is depicted in Figure 2.
As shown in section 4, the steady state, (K¤; C¤) is a saddle point; thus there exists a unique
equilibrium path converging to this steady state.6
4 The welfare effects of regulation of entry
In the rest of this paper, we examine whether free entry maximizes social welfare, that is,
the representative agent’s lifetime utility. In this section, in particular, we examine whether a
marginal decrease in the number of entrants improves social welfare.
First, we suppose that the economy is on the steady state of the free entry equilibrium path
initially. Then we examine how regulating entry affects the welfare. More concretely, we
examine how an increase in the entry tax rate, m affects the welfare. Alternatively, we can
assume that the government can control the number of entrants directly. In this case, we can
interpret that the government regulates the entry so that the profit flow that each entrant can earn
is equal to mq(w; r)Á.
From (8), the number of entrants satisfies½
[¹(Nt)¡ 1]
µ
Kt
®L1¡®
Nt
¡ Á
¶
¡ Á
¾
= mÁ:
6The economy has the equilibrium path converging to the origin, that is, a poverty trap. For more information
on this point, see Gali and Zilibotti (1995).
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Rewriting this, we obtain
[1 + (¾Nt ¡ 1)(1 +m)]ÁNt = K®t L1¡®: (29)
We let N(K;m) denote the function that satisfies (29). Totally differentiating (29), we obtain
@N(K;m)
@m
= ¡ N(¾N ¡ 1)
1 + (2¾N ¡ 1)(1 +m) < 0: (30)
Therefore, it is straightforward to show that N(K;m) is a decreasing function of m for any
constant value of K. This means that a government must reduce the number of entrants to keep
the profit flow high. The resource constraint is given by
_Kt = Kt
®L1¡® ¡ ÁN(Kt;m)¡ Ct:
The market equilibrium path is characterized by the following two differential equations:
_Kt = F (Kt;m)¡ Ct; (31)
_Ct
Ct
=
1
µ
[r(Kt;m)¡ ½] ; (32)
where
F (Kt;m) ´ Kt®L1¡® ¡ ÁN(Kt;m); (33)
r(Kt;m) ´
·
1¡ 1
¾N(Kt;m)
¸
®Kt
®¡1L1¡®: (34)
Because we will need the partial derivatives of F (K;m) and r(K;m), we calculate them in
advance. Partially differentiating (33) and (34) with respect to K and m, we obtain
FK(K;m) = ®K
®¡1L1¡® ¡ ÁNK(K;m) > 0; (35)
rK(K;m) =
·
NK(K;m)
¾[N(K;m)]2
¡ (1¡ ®)(¾N ¡ 1)
K¾N(K;m)
¸
®K®¡1L1¡®; (36)
Fm(K;m) = ¡ÁNm(K;m) > 0; (37)
rm(K;m) =
Nm(K;m)
¾[N(K;m)]2
®K®¡1L1¡® < 0; (38)
where, hereafter a variable with the subscript denotes its partial derivative with respect to change
in the subscript; e.g. FK(K;m) = [@F (K;m)]=[@K]. Linearizing (31) and (32) around the
steady state yields 24 _Kt
_Ct
35 =
24 FK(K¤;m) ¡1
C¤
µ
rK(K
¤;m) 0
3524 Kt ¡K¤
Ct ¡ C¤
35 ; (39)
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Here, we let J denote the Jacobian matrix and let º1 and º2 denote the negative and positive
eigenvalues respectively as shown below. The determinant of this Jacobian matrix can be cal-
culated as follows:
detJ = C
¤
µ
rK(K
¤;m) < 0; (40)
where, we use the fact that rK(K¤;m) < 0. By (40), we have shown that the steady state is a
saddle point.
Next, we examine how the change in the number of entrants affects the steady state values
of capital stock and consumption. From (31) and (32), these steady state values satisfy the
following equations:
F (K¤;m) = C¤; (41)
r(K¤;m) = ½: (42)
Differentiating the both sides of (42) with respect to m, we obtain
dK¤
dm
= ¡rm(K
¤;m)
rK(K¤;m)
: (43)
Because both rm(K¤;m) and rK(K¤;m) are negative, (dK¤)=(dm) is negative. This means
that a marginal decrease in the number of entrants impedes capital accumulation in the long
run. Moreover, differentiating both sides of (41) with respect to m and substituting (43) into
(44), we obtain
dC¤
dm
= Fm(K
¤;m)¡ FK(K¤;m)rm(K
¤;m)
rK(K¤;m)
: (44)
To find the sign of (44), we must examine whether FK(K¤;m) [¡rM(K¤;m)] ¡Fm(K¤;m)
[¡rK(K¤;m)] is positive or negative. Substituting these partial derivatives into (44) and using
(29) and (42), we can summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A marginal decrease in the number of entrants necessarily reduces the steady
state level of capital stock. A marginal decrease in the number of entrants reduces the steady
state level of consumption if the number of entrants at the steady state satisfies the following
inequality:
N¤ · 1¡ ®
¾(1¡ 2®) : (45)
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As shown in section 6, higher elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, higher
entry cost, and a lower subjective discount rate tend to make the steady state value of the num-
ber of entrants in the free entry equilibrium smaller. According to this relationship between the
number of entrants and the parameters, we can understand Proposition 2 as follows: a decrease
in the number of entrants tends to make consumption lower in the long run in the economy with
higher elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, higher entry cost, and a lower sub-
jective discount rate. This implies that a marginal decrease in the number of entrants aggravates
social welfare in the long run.
In the final part of this section, we analyze the welfare effect by a marginal decrease in the
number of entrants. For simplicity, we suppose that the instantaneous utility function takes the
logarithmic form (µ = 1). From (19), the consumption path is given by
c(t;m) = c(0;m) exp
Z t
0
[r(K(v;m);m)¡ ½] dv; (46)
where, c(t;m) and K(t;m) denote per capita consumption and capital stock at time t when the
profit flow is mqÁ respectively. As shown in Appendix 1, a marginal decrease in the number of
entrants raises the initial level of consumption. Therefore a marginal decrease in the number of
entrants improves social welfare in the short run.
Substituting (46) and C(t;m) = c(t;m)L into (16) gives the indirect utility function as
follows:
U(m) =
1
½
[logC(0;m)¡ logL] +
Z 1
0
½Z t
0
[r(K(v;m);m)¡ ½] dv
¾
e¡½tdt; (47)
Using Judd’s (1982) method, we differentiate (47) with respect to m and obtain the formula for
the welfare effect caused by a change in the profit rate, that is, the number of entrants is
dU(m)
dm
=
1
½
Cm(0;m)
C(0;m)
+
Z 1
0
½Z t
0
[rK(K
¤;m)Km(v;m) + rm(K¤;m)] dv
¾
e¡½tdt: (48)
The purpose of this section is to examine whether a marginal decrease in the number of entrants
improves social welfare, and therefore we assume that the economy is initially in the free entry
equilibrium, that is, m = 0. As shown in Appendix 1, (48) can be rewritten as
dU(m)
dm
jm=0 = 1
½
·
Cm(0; 0)
C(0; 0)
+
rm(K
¤; 0)
½¡ º1
¸
: (49)
(49) shows that we can separate the welfare effect of reducing the number of entrants into
two subeffects. The first term of the right-hand side of (49) represents the effect on the initial
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consumption. Because a decrease of the number of entrants saves using inputs for fixed cost,
this effect raises the initial consumption and social welfare. This short-run effect corresponds to
the jump from E to E 0 as depicted in Figure 3. Next, the second term on the right-hand side of
(49) represents the effect on capital accumulation. A decrease in the number of entrants reduces
the demand for capital and the rental rate, r, and impedes capital accumulation and lowers the
steady state level of capital stock. Therefore, this effect reduces the consumption level and
social welfare in the long run. This long-run effect corresponds to the transition from E 0 to E 00
as depicted in Figure 3. To sum up, if the former positive effect dominates the latter negative
effect, a marginal decrease in the number of entrants improves social welfare. As shown in
Appendix 1, dU(m)
dm
jm=0 > 0. Hence the increase in welfare due to an increase of the initial
consumption is larger than the decrease of welfare due to a decrease of the steady state level of
capital stock. Therefore, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Suppose that the economy is initially in the steady state of the free entry equi-
librium. A marginal decrease in the number of entrants improves social welfare.
This proposition implies that free entry results in excess entry also in the dynamic gen-
eral equilibrium. In other words, the excess entry theorem holds true in the dynamic general
equilibrium model.
5 Second-best equilibrium
In the previous section, we examine only how a marginal decrease in the number of entrants
affects social welfare. However, as mentioned in Introduction, governments change policies
of regulation of entry over time depending on the market size of economies in a real world:
for most of developed countries, the governments regulate entry in the early stages of their
development and relax the regulation of entry gradually after the economies developed fully. In
this section, in accordance with the actual tendency of the behaviors of governments, we assume
that a government can control the number of entrants intertemporally so as to maximize social
welfare and examine how many firms a government allows to enter the market in the long run.
In particular, we consider the following circumstance: a government can control the num-
ber of firms, however, a government cannot control the pricing behavior of the firms; in this
13
sense, the equilibrium in this circumstance is second-best one. In second-best equilibrium, a
government chooses path of the number of entrants, fNtg1t=0, to maximize the lifetime utility
of the representative household (16) subject to Euler equation (19), rental rate of capital (10)
and resource constraint. Therefore, the dynamic optimal entry problem by a government can be
formulated as follows: 7
max
fNtg1t=0
Z 1
0
e¡½t
(Ct=L)
1¡µ ¡ 1
1¡ µ dt;
subject to
_Ct
Ct
=
1
µ
·
1
¹(Nt)
®Kt
®¡1L1¡® ¡ ½
¸
;
_Kt = Kt
®L1¡® ¡ ÁNt ¡ Ct;
lim
t!1
e¡½tCt¡µKt = 0:
The current–value Hamiltonian for a government’s problem is given by
Ht =
C1¡µt L
µ¡1 ¡ 1
1¡ µ + ¸1;t
1
µ
·µ
1¡ 1
¾Nt
¶
®K®¡1t L
1¡® ¡ ½
¸
Ct + ¸2;t
¡
K®t L
1¡® ¡ ÁNt ¡ Ct
¢
;(50)
where ¸1 and ¸2 are the costate variables for C and K respectively. The necessary conditions
for this dynamic optimization problem are the following:
@Ht
@Nt
= ¸1;t
1
µ¾Nt
2®K
®¡1
t L
1¡®Ct ¡ ¸2;tÁ = 0; (51)
@Ht
@Ct
= C¡µt L
1¡µ + ¸1;t
1
µ
·µ
1¡ 1
¾Nt
¶
®K®¡1t L
1¡® ¡ ½
¸
¡ ¸2;t = ½¸1;t ¡ _¸ 1;t; (52)
@Ht
@Kt
= ¡¸1;t1
µ
µ
1¡ 1
¾Nt
¶
®(1¡ ®)K®¡2t L1¡®Ct + ¸2;t®K®¡1t L1¡® = ½¸2;t ¡ _¸ 2;t; (53)
lim
t!1
e¡½t¸1;tCt = 0;
lim
t!1
e¡½t¸2;tKt = 0:
¸1;0 = 0:
In the steady state equilibrium, _C = 0. From (21), the following equation holds in the steady
state: µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
®K®¡1L1¡® = ½: (54)
7A government regulates the entry of firms in the case of excess entry. On the other hand, in the case of
insufficient entry, a government gives entrants subsidies to enhance the entry of firms by imposing lump-sum taxes
on households.
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In addition, because _¸2 = 0 in the steady state, we obtain ¡¸1¸¡12 µ¡1 [1¡ (¾N)¡1]®(1 ¡
®)K®¡2L1¡®C + ®K®¡1L1¡® = ½. From this equation and (51), we can obtain
¡(1¡ ®)Á¾N
2
K
µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
+ ®K®¡1L1¡® = ½: (55)
Moreover, we examine whether there exist optimal paths converging to the steady state. Con-
cerning the stability of the steady state, according to Appendix 2, we can show that there exist
parameter values such that the steady state is stable.
6 The comparison of the free entry equilibrium and the second-
best equilibrium
In this section, we compare the number of firms in the steady state under the free entry equi-
librium with the number of firms in the steady state under the second-best policy. From (21)
and (23) in Section 3, N and K in the steady state under the free entry equilibrium satisfy the
following equations: µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
®K®¡1L1¡® = ½: (56)
Á¾N2 = K®L1¡®: (57)
From (54) and (55) in Section 4, N and K in the steady state under the second-best policy
satisfy the following equations: µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
®K®¡1L1¡® = ½: (58)
¡(1¡ ®)Á¾N
2
K
µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
+ ®K®¡1L1¡® = ½: (59)
Moreover, we can rewrite (55) by using (54) as follows:
1¡ ®
®
Á¾(¾N ¡ 1)N2 = K®L1¡®: (60)
In order to compare the number of firms in the steady state under the free entry equilibrium,
NFE with the number of firms in the steady state of the second-best policy, NSB , we depict
graphs of the relations that satisfy the above equations in the N-K space. First, call the relation
that satisfies (56) and (58) the Steady State line. They can be depicted in the N-K plane as
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shown in Figure 4. Next, call the relation that satisfies (57) and the relation that satisfies (60)
Free Entry line and Second-best line respectively. They can be depicted in the N-K plane as
shown in Figure 4. The number of firms in the free entry equilibrium, NFE is determined by
the intersection of the Steady State line and the Free Entry line. In the same way, the number of
firms in the second-best equilibrium, NSB is determined by the intersection of the Steady State
line and the Second-best line.
Using these figures, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If ®2
h
(1¡ ®)2¾L
Á
i 1¡®
®
< ½ < ®
2
2¡®
½h
2(1¡®)
2¡®
i2 ³
¾L
Á
´¾ 1¡®®
, the number of firms
in the free entry equilibrium is less than the number of firms in the second-best equilibrium. In
other words, the free entry equilibrium leads to insufficient entry. If ®2
h
(1¡ ®)2¾L
Á
i 1¡®
®
> ½,
the number of firms in the free entry equilibrium is more than the number of firms in the second-
best equilibrium. In other words, the free entry equilibrium leads to excess entry.
Proof. First, we assume that the values of the parameters satisfy (28), that is,
®2
2¡ ®
(·
2(1¡ ®)
2¡ ®
¸2µ
¾L
Á
¶) 1¡®®
> ½: (61)
Inspecting Figures 4 and 5, we find that NFE > NSB when the intersection of the Free Entry
line and the Second-best line is above the Steady State line. Let (K^; N^) denote the intersection
of the Free Entry line and the Second-best line. From (21), (57) and (60), we obtain
K^ =
·
Á
¾(1¡ ®)2L1¡®
¸ 1
®
; N^ =
1
¾(1¡ ®) : (62)
From (62) and (21), the condition for NFE < NSB is given by
®2
·
(1¡ ®)2¾L
Á
¸ 1¡®
®
< ½ (63)
Here, all the values of the parameters must satisfy (28). Therefore we derive the values of
the parameters that satisfy both (28) and (63). Such parameters meet the following inequalities:
®2
·
(1¡ ®)2¾L
Á
¸ 1¡®
®
< ½ <
®2
2¡ ®
(·
2(1¡ ®)
2¡ ®
¸2µ
¾L
Á
¶) 1¡®®
: (64)
To show that the values that satisfy (64) exist, we derive the condition that the first term of (64)
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is less than the third term of (64).
®2
·
(1¡ ®)2¾L
Á
¸ 1¡®
®
<
®2
2¡ ®
(·
2(1¡ ®)
2¡ ®
¸2µ
¾L
Á
¶) 1¡®®
;
2¡ ® < 41¡ 12¡® : (65)
This inequality holds strictly true for all ® 2 (0; 1) and therefore we have shown that there exist
the values of ¾; Á, and, L that satisfy (64) for all ® 2 (0; 1). In other words, insufficient entry
can occur for any value of ® 2 (0; 1).
Proposition 4, means that in contrast to the results of the partial equilibrium analyses, the
number of entrants under free entry may be less than the second-best number of entrants in
dynamic general equilibrium environments; that is, insufficient entry can occur. In the static
general equilibrium analysis of Konishi et al.(1990), the existence of the factor intensity twist
between the oligopolistic and the competitive sectors plays a crucial role in determining whether
excess entry occurs. It should be noted that this insufficient entry occurs although there is no
such factor intensity twist in the present framework, that is, the dynamic general equilibrium
analysis.
Why may the number of entrants under the second-best equilibrium be larger than one under
the free entry equilibrium? The reason is as follows: an increase in the number of entrants
raises the intensity of competition and thus increases the demand of capital. This raises the
rental of capital and thus promotes capital accumulation. When this positive effect dominates
any other negative effect, an increase in the number of entrants improves social welfare. It
should be noted that this positive effect of increasing the number of entrants appears only when
considering capital accumulation.
Moreover, Proposition 4 shows that higher elasticity of substitution among intermediate
goods, larger population, lower entry cost, and a lower discount rate tends to lead the free entry
equilibrium to excess entry. Here, we let L and ® be constant, and focus our attention on the
elasticity of substitution, ¾ and the fixed cost, Á, and then investigate what values of ¾ and
Á lead to excess entry or insufficient entry. We depict the line of the values of ¾ and Á that
satisfy the equality of (28) in the Á-¾ space as depicted in Figure 6. The region below this line
corresponds to the values of Á and ¾ that do not satisfy (28); that is, an economy with such
17
values has an interest rate which is too low, and no steady states. In the same way, we depicted
the values of ¾ and Á that satisfy the equality of (63) in the Á-¾ space. The region below this
line corresponds to the values of Á and ¾ that satisfy (63); that is, insufficient entry occurs in
an economy with such values. On the other hand, in an economy with the values in the region
above the line, excess entry occurs.
7 Conclusion
This paper have presented a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium in dynamic general equi-
librium environments with Cournot competition.
First, in section 4, we have shown that a marginal decrease in the number of firms at the free
entry equilibrium improves social welfare. This result is consistent with one of the partial equi-
librium analyses, that is, the excess entry theorem, which is shown by Perry (1984), Mankiw
and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).
Second, in sections 5 and 6, we have assumed that a government can control the number of
entrants intertemporally so as to maximize the level of social welfare and derived the number of
entrants in the steady state under this second-best equilibrium. Consequently, we have shown
that the number of entrants under free entry may be less than the second-best number of entrants,
that is, free entry may lead to insufficient entry in contrast to the result of partial equilibrium
analyses. Why may an increase in the number of entrants improve social welfare in a dynamic
model with capital accumulation? The reason is as follows: an increase in the number of
entrants raises the intensity of competition and thus increases the demand of capital. This
raises the rental of capital and thus promotes capital accumulation. When this positive effect
dominates any other negative effect, an increase in the number of entrants improves social
welfare.
The results of this paper indicate that capital accumulation plays an important role when
considering deregulation policies. A government must take care to check not only whether its
policies promote entry into industries but also whether these policies stimulate capital forma-
tion.
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A Appendix 1
In this appendix, following Futagami et al.(1993), we use Judd’s (1982) method to prove Propo-
sition 1. First, we examine how a marginal decrease in the number of entrants affects initial
consumption. Differentiating (31) and (32) with respect to m in the neighborhood of the steady
state, we obtain24 _Km
_Cm
35 =
24 FK(K¤;m) ¡1
C¤
µ
rK(K
¤;m) 0
3524 Km
Cm
35+
24 Fm(K¤;m)
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m)
35 : (66)
Here, we let eK(s) and eC(s) denote the Laplace transformation of Kt and Ct, respectively; e.g.eK(s) ´ R1
0
Kte
¡stdt. Taking the Laplace transformations of (66), we obtain24 s eKm
s eCm ¡ Cm(0;m)
35 =
24 FK(K¤;m) ¡1
C¤
µ
rK(K
¤;m) 0
3524 eKmeCm
35+
264 1sFm(K¤;m)1
s
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m)
375 :
where we use the fact that Km(0;m) = 0. We can reduce this to24 eKmeCm
35 = (sI ¡ J)¡1
264 1sFm(K¤;m)
Cm(0;m) +
1
s
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m)
375 : (67)
Here, we can rewrite the inverse of the matrix, (sI ¡ J)¡1, as follows:
(sI ¡ J)¡1 = 1
det(sI ¡ J)adj(sI ¡ J) =
1
(s¡ º1)(s¡ º2)adj(sI ¡ J); (68)
where adj(sI ¡ J) is the adjoint matrix of (sI ¡ J), that is,
adj(sI ¡ J) =
24 s¡ J22 J12
J21 s¡ J11
35 :
Substituting (68) into (67), we can rewrite (67) as follows:
24 eKmeCm
35 =
24 s¡ J22 J12
J21 s¡ J11
35
264 1sFm(K¤;m)
Cm(0;m) +
1
s
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m)
375
(s¡ º1)(s¡ º2) : (69)
The solutions for Km(t;m) and Cm(t;m) must be bounded. If s = º2 > 0, det(sI¡J) = 0 and
the denominator of the left-hand side of (69) becomes 0. Therefore, the numerator of the left-
hand side of (69) must also be 0 in order to obtain bounded solutions. Therefore the following
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condition must be satisfied:
º2 ¡ J22
º2
Fm(K
¤;m) + J12
·
Cm(0;m) +
1
º2
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m)
¸
= 0: (70)
Because J22 = 0 and J12 = ¡1, we obtain
Cm(0;m) = Fm(K
¤;m)¡ 1
º2
C¤
µ
rm(K
¤;m) > 0; (71)
where we use Fm(K¤;m) > 0 and rm(K¤;m) < 0. Consequently, we have shown that a
marginal decrease in number of entrants raises initial consumption. Next, we examine how
a marginal decrease in the number of entrants affects the lifetime utility of the representative
agent. In the rest of the paper, we assume that µ = 1 for simplicity. The effect of the decrease
in the number of entrants on K(t;m) is given by
Km(t;m) =
¡
1¡ eº1t¢Km¤; (72)
where we use Km(0;m) = 0. Substituting (72) into (48) yields
dU(m)
dm
=
1
½
Cm(0;m)
C(0;m)
+
Z 1
0
Z t
0
f[rK(K¤;m)Km¤ + rm(K¤;m)]
¡rK(K¤;m)Km¤eº1vgdv e¡½tdt; (73)
Because we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state, we obtain
rK(K
¤;m)Km¤ + rm(K¤;m) = 0: (74)
Substituting (74) into (73), we obtain
dU(m)
dm
=
1
½
·
Cm(0;m)
C(0;m)
+
rm(K
¤;m)
½¡ º1
¸
: (75)
The first term of the right-hand side of (75) represents the effect of a decrease in the number
of entrants on the initial consumption, which is positive. The second term of the right-hand
side of (75) represents the effect of a decrease in the number of entrants on the growth rate of
consumption, which is negative.
Substituting (71) and C¤ = F (K¤;m) into (75) yields
dU(m)
dm
=
1
½
·
Fm(K
¤;m)
F (K¤;m)
+
µ
1
½¡ º1 ¡
1
º2
¶
rm(K
¤;m)
¸
: (76)
20
Substituting (37) and (38) into (76), we obtain
dU(m)
dm
=
¡Nm(K¤;m)
½
½
Á
F (K¤;m)
¡
µ
1
½¡ º1 ¡
1
º2
¶
®K¤®¡1L1¡®
¾[N(K¤;m)]2
¾
: (77)
In order to examine whether a marginal decrease in the number of entrants improves social
welfare when the economy is in the free entry equilibrium, we substitute m = 0 into (77).
Because we assume that the economy is initially in the free entry equilibrium, from (21) and
(23), K¤ and N¤ satisfy µ
1¡ 1
¾N¤
¶
®K¤®¡1L1¡® = ½; (78)
Á¾N¤2 = K¤®L1¡®: (79)
From (78), we obtain ®K¤®¡1L®¡1 = ½¾N¤
¾N¤¡1 . Moreover, using (79), we obtain F (K¤;m) =
K¤®L1¡® ¡ ÁN¤ = ÁN¤(¾N¤ ¡ 1). Substituting these terms into (77), we obtain
dU(m)
dm
¯¯
m=0
= ¡ Nm(K
¤; 0)
½N¤(¾N¤ ¡ 1)
·
1¡
µ
1
½¡ º1 ¡
1
º2
¶
½
¸
= ¡ Nm(K
¤; 0)
½N¤(¾N¤ ¡ 1)
½2 ¡ º1 (º2 + ½)
º2(½¡ º1)
> 0:
where we use º1 < 0 < º2. This proves Eq. (49).
B Appendix 2
In this appendix, we prove that there exist parameter values such that the steady state is stable.
By linearizing the system of the differential equations, we obtain the following:
0BBBBBB@
¢
k
¢
c
¢
¸1
¢
¸2
1CCCCCCA = A
0BBBBBB@
k ¡ k¤
c¡ c¤
¸1 ¡ ¸¤1
¸2 ¡ ¸¤2
1CCCCCCA ;
where the entries, aij of the Jacobian matrix, A are given by
a11 = ®k
®¡1 + (1¡®)
eÁN
2k
; a12 = ¡
³
1 +
eÁN
2c
´
; a13 =
eÁN
2¸1
; a14 = ¡ eÁN2¸2 ;
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a21 = ¡ cµ
¡
1¡ 1
2¾N
¢
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2; a22 = 12¾Nµ®k®¡1;
a23 = ¡ cµ 12¾N 1¸1®k®¡1; a24 = cµ 12¾N 1¸2®k®¡1;
a31 = ¸1(1¡ ®)®k®¡2 ¡ cµ¸2
h
1
2¾N
1
¸1
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2 + ¡1¡ 1
¾N
¢
(2¡ ®)(1¡ ®)®k®¡3
i
a32 =
1
µ
¸2
¡
1¡ 1
2¾N
¢
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2; a33 = ½¡ ®k®¡1 ¡ cµ 12¾N ¸2¸1 (1¡ ®)®k®¡2;
a34 =
c
µ
¡
1¡ 1
2¾N
¢
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2
a41 =
¸2
µ
¡
1¡ 1
2¾N
¢
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2; a42 = ¡µc¡µ¡1 ¡ 1µ ¸2c 12¾N®k®¡1;
a43 = 1 +
1
µ
¸2
¸1
1
2¾N
®k®¡1; a44 = ½¡ 1µ 12¾N®k®¡1;
where eÁ ´ Á=L. From (49), (50), and (53)-(55), the following conditions hold at the steady
state: µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
®k®¡1 = ½; (80)
k® = eÁN + c; (81)
®k®¡1 ¡ ½ = c
µ
µ
1¡ 1
¾N
¶
¸2
¸1
(1¡ ®)®k®¡2; (82)
¸1 + ½¸2 = c
¡µ; (83)
c
µ
1
¾N
®k®¡1 =
¸1
¸2
eÁN: (84)
From (80) and (82), we obtain
1 =
c
µ
(¾N ¡ 1)1¡ ®
k
¸2
¸1
: (85)
From (80) and (84), we obtain
½
c
µ
1
(¾N ¡ 1) =
¸1
¸2
eÁN: (86)
These two equations (85) and (86) result in
½k = (1¡ ®)eÁN(¾N ¡ 1)2: (87)
This equation and (80) determine the steady state values of k and N .
From (83) and (86), we obtain
¸1 =
c¡µc
µeÁ(¾N ¡ 1) + c; (88)
22
¸2 =
c¡µµeÁ(¾N ¡ 1)
½[µeÁ(¾N ¡ 1) + c] : (89)
By using (80). (81), and (87), we obtain
c = eÁN ·1¡ ®
®
¾N(¾N ¡ 1)¡ 1
¸
: (90)
Based on (80), (87), (88), and (89), we can rewrite the Jacobian matrix, A as follows:0BBBBBB@
½ ¾N
¾N¡1 +
½
2(¾N¡1)2 ¡1¡
eÁN
2c
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]eÁN
2c¡µc ¡½ [µ
eÁ(¾N¡1)+c]
2c¡µµ(¾N¡1)
¡½2 c
µ
2¾N¡1
2eÁN(¾N¡1)3 ½1µ 12(¾N¡1) ¡½ [µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]2c¡µµ(¾N¡1) ½2 [µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]c2c¡µµ2eÁN(¾N¡1)2
a31 ½
c¡µ
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2 ¡½ 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2 ½2 cµ 2¾N¡12eÁN(¾N¡1)3
½ c
¡µ
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2 a42 1 + eÁN2c ½¡ ½1µ 12(¾N¡1)
1CCCCCCA ;
where a31 = ½2 1eÁ(¾N¡1)3 c¡µc[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]
¡
¾ ¡ 1
N
2¡®
1¡®
¢¡ ½
2(¾N¡1)2 and a42 = ¡µc¡µ¡1¡ c
¡µ¡1eÁN
2[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] .
We next calculate the determinant of this matrix, detA. Multiplying the components in
the third column by ½ c
µeÁN(¾N¡1) and adding them to the components in the fourth column, we
obtain the following:¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
a11 a12 a13 0
a21 a22 a23 0
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 a43 ½
³
1 + c
µeÁN(¾N¡1)
´
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
= ½
Ã
1 +
c
µeÁN(¾N ¡ 1)
! ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
¯
½ ¾N
¾N¡1 +
½
2(¾N¡1)2 ¡1¡
eÁN
2c
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]eÁN
2c¡µc
¡½2 c
µ
2¾N¡1
2eÁN(¾N¡1)3 ½µ 12(¾N¡1) ¡½ [µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]2c¡µµ(¾N¡1)
a31
½c¡µ
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2 ¡½ 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯ :
Moreover, multiplying the components in the second column of the above 3£ 3 determinant by
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]
c¡µ and adding them to the components in the third column, we obtain the following:
½
Ã
1 +
c
µeÁN(¾N ¡ 1)
! ¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯
¯
½ ¾N
¾N¡1 +
½
2(¾N¡1)2 ¡1¡
eÁN
2c
¡ [µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c]
c¡µ
¡½2 c
µ
2¾N¡1
2eÁN(¾N¡1)3 ½µ 12(¾N¡1) 0
a31
½c¡µ
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2 0
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯
= ¡½
Ã
1 +
c
µeÁN(¾N ¡ 1)
!
[µeÁ(¾N ¡ 1) + c]
c¡µ
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ¡½2 cµ 2¾N¡12eÁN(¾N¡1)3 ½µ 12(¾N¡1)
a31
½c¡µ
[µeÁ(¾N¡1)+c] 2¾N¡12(¾N¡1)2
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ :
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Therefore, because the coefficient of the above 2 £ 2 determinant takes a negative value, the
sign of detA is determined by this 2£ 2 determinant. We denote this 2£ 2 determinant by ¡.
For simplicity, we set µ = 1. ¡ becomes
¡ = ¡½3 (2¾N ¡ 1)
2
2eÁN(¾N ¡ 1)5 1[eÁ(¾N ¡ 1) + c] ¡ ½ 12(¾N ¡ 1)a31
= ¡ ½
4(¾N ¡ 1)3
"
½(2¾N ¡ 1)2 + 2(¾N ¡ 1) ¡¾N ¡ 2¡®
1¡®
¢
eÁN(¾N ¡ 1)2[eÁ(¾N ¡ 1) + c] ¡ 1
#
= ¡ ½
4(¾N ¡ 1)3
"
½(2¾N ¡ 1)2 + 2(¾N ¡ 1) ¡¾N ¡ 2¡®
1¡®
¢
(eÁN)2(¾N ¡ 1)2[(¾N ¡ 1) ¡1¡®
®
¾N + 1
¢¡ 1] ¡ 1
#
;
where we have used (90). Therefore if the numerator of the term in the brace is larger than
the denominator of this term, ¡ takes a negative value and thus detA takes a positive value.
Consequently, the system of the differential equation can be stable.8 In order to examine this,
we draw the graphs of the numerator and the denominator. Consider the case where those
graphs are depicted as in Figure 6. The numerator is a quadratic function of N and takes a
positive value of N = 1=¾. The denominator is a 6th order equation of N and becomes 0 at
N = 1=¾. Consequently ¡ takes positive values in the interval, [1=¾; Nmax].
8See Dockner and Feichtinger (1991) and Kemp, Long, and Shimomura (1993).
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Figure 3: The effect of a marginal decrease of the number of entrants
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Figure 4: The case of excess entry
30
0 K
N steady state line
free entry line
second-best line
NFE
NSB
1
¾
(®½¡1)
1
1¡®L
Figure 5: The case of insufficient entry
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Figure 6: The values of the parameters
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Figure 7: The values of N when the second-best equilibrium is stable
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